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The Full Impact of the
Affordable Care Act on
Political Participation
Ch a r les Court em a nche , Ja mes Ma rt on ,
a n d A a ron Y el ow i t z

This article examines the impact of both the Medicaid expansion and the private insurance-related components of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on voter turnout and registration. We employ a difference-in-
difference-in-differences identification strategy exploiting variation over time, state Medicaid expansion
status, and within-state local area pre-ACA uninsured rates. Using data between 2006 and 2016 from the
November Current Population Survey and the Census Bureau’s Small Area Health Insurance Estimates, our
results suggest little effect of the ACA on voter turnout or registration.
Keywords: voter turnout, Affordable Care Act, Medicaid, health-care finance, health insurance

According to the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, the share of U.S. gross domestic product devoted to health-care spending rose from 13.4 to 17.3 percent between 2000
and 2009. Thus, the major changes to such an
important part of the economy brought on by
the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 were anticipated to have broad social, political, and economic effects extending beyond the health-care

sector itself. Despite this, most of the existing
ACA literature has focused on effects within the
health-care sector. Moreover, much of the literature interested in estimating causal effects
has examined the impact of individual components of the ACA, such as the Medicaid expansion, alone (Kaestner et al. 2017; Simon, Soni,
and Cawley 2017; Maclean and Saloner 2019).
Fewer causal studies examine not only the
ACA Medicaid expansion, but also the other pri-
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effects of t he a ffor da ble ca r e act

vate components of the ACA implemented in
2014 at the same time. Several works document
gains in health insurance coverage coming
from both the Medicaid expansion and the
other components of the ACA (Courtemanche
et al. 2016, 2017, 2019b; Frean, Gruber, and Sommers 2017). Molly Frean, Jonathan Gruber, and
Benjamin Sommers (2017) estimate that 60 percent of the coverage gains occurring in 2014 and
2015 can be attributed to the Medicaid expansion with the other 40 percent being attributed
to subsidized Marketplace coverage. Others
have examined the impact of the ACA on self-
assessed health, access to care, and risky health
behaviors (Courtemanche et al. 2018a, 2018b,
2019a). These studies tend to find that any impact of the ACA on these outcomes is driven by
the non-Medicaid expansion components of
the law.
Looking beyond effects within the health-
care sector, the purpose of this article is to
examine the impact of the ACA on civic engagement through political participation, specifically voter turnout and registration. The 2010
congressional election, where Republicans
picked up sixty-three seats in the House of Representatives, may have served as a referendum
on the ACA. Conversely, Democrats picked up
forty seats in the 2018 congressional election
where health care and the potential repeal of
the ACA were major issues. During the 2018
election cycle, health care was the dominating
issue in campaign ads, where pro-Democratic
ads featured the issue 47 percent of the time,
and the overall issue of preexisting conditions
was front and center.1 Those most likely to be
uninsured prior to the ACA (the young, minorities, and the low income) traditionally have
low voter turnout. If the debate surrounding
the ACA mobilized these new constituencies,
then changes in political participation due to
the ACA may have broader social impacts beyond changes in health policy.
Our primary empirical approach involves estimating difference-in-difference-in-differences
(DDD) models, with differences coming from

time, state Medicaid expansion status, and local area pre-ACA uninsured rates (Courtemanche et al. 2017). The third difference leverages
the fact that the ACA is expected to have a stronger impact in areas with higher pre-ACA uninsured rates.2 This approach allows us to identify
the effect of the private components of the ACA
separately from the Medicaid expansion. Our
baseline DDD model includes the full voting
eligible population (U.S. citizens age eighteen
or older) using the November 2006–2016 Current Population Survey (CPS). We also consider
heterogeneity in the impact of the ACA within
demographic groups (age, race, and income).
Focusing on subgroups can help identify particular constituencies who may have responded
to the ACA in different manners.
Our empirical approach and use of the CPS
extends the ACA and voting literature in several
ways. First, we estimate the impact of both the
Medicaid expansion and the private components of the ACA on political participation. The
ACA-related gains for private coverage for more
affluent individuals affected approximately
eleven million Americans (CMS n.d.). Second,
our principal results rely on individual-level microdata, allowing us to control for a broad set
of individual covariates as well as by subgroup
and type of election. Finally, we include controls for economic and political environment,
including voting reforms that may separately
affect turnout and registration.
Across a variety of specifications, we typically find small and insignificant effects of the
ACA on turnout or registration, in contrast to
earlier work. But we don’t know why. The evolving literature on Medicaid’s valuation and the
health effects of the ACA is mixed (Finkelstein,
Hendren, and Shepard 2019; Gruber and Sommers 2019), possibly suggesting a smaller mobilization effect than one may anticipate. The
political science concept of the “delegated” or
“submerged” welfare state suggests that those
gaining coverage may not be fully aware that
they are benefiting from a public program (Mettler 2011; Morgan and Campbell 2011).

1. Wesleyan Media Project, “2018: The Health Care Election,” October 18, 2018, http://mediaproject.wesleyan.
edu/releases/101818-tv (accessed January 9, 2020).
2. This approach mimics the earlier work of Amy Finkelstein (2007), who studied the initial introduction of
Medicare, and Sarah Miller (2012), who studied Massachusetts’s health reform.
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P r e v i o u s Li t e r at u r e

To date, two published studies examine the impact of the ACA’s Medicaid expansions on voter
turnout and registration. Jake Haselswerdt
(2017) examines voter turnout in a difference-
in-difference (DD) framework (relying on variation across states and over time) with district-
level turnout data from the 2012 presidential
election and 2014 congressional election for the
435 congressional districts across all fifty U.S.
states. He finds robust evidence that increased
Medicaid enrollment is associated with higher
turnout and likely due to both increased participation by new beneficiaries and backlash.
The point estimates imply that for every hundred individuals who gained Medicaid coverage
due to the ACA expansions, between fifty-one
and 113 others turned out to vote in 2014 (Haselswerdt 2017, 683).
This enormous magnitude could potentially
reflect spillovers, newly engaged Medicaid recipients spreading enthusiasm (or reflecting
backlash) to others whose coverage status did
not change. Alternatively, it could be driven by
methodological issues. The DD research design
assumes that, conditional on controls, changes
in voter turnout between 2012 and 2014 would
have been the same in expansion and non-
expansion states in the absence of the ACA.
Given only one period of pre-ACA data, it is not
possible to examine pretreatment trends to
evaluate the validity of this assumption. Moreover, comparing a presidential election year
with a congressional election year increases the
risk of confounding. If the dip in turnout in
congressional relative to presidential elections
differs systematically between Republican-and
Democratic-majority states, the identifying assumption would be violated. In contrast, we use
a DDD research design that allows for differential trends between expansion and non-
expansion states as long as this difference is
uncorrelated with pre-ACA uninsured rates.
Moreover, we separately examine both presidential and congressional elections with multiple pretreatment years.
Joshua Clinton and Michael Sances (2018)
examine Medicaid’s effect on turnout and registration using a DDD framework (relying on
variation across states, over time, and by the
percentage of near-poor adults in a county) and
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county-level elections data for thirty-t wo states,
comparing changes in the 2010 and 2014 congressional elections and changes in the 2012
and 2016 presidential elections. In their most
carefully controlled specifications, they find
that the ACA Medicaid expansion increased
voter registration by up to 4 percentage points
in 2014 (effects persisting through 2016) and increased voter turnout in 2014 by up to 2.4 percentage points, though this estimate is not statistically significant. Further, they do not find
any impact on voter turnout in 2016.
Their methodology is similar to ours in that
it includes a third difference meant to capture
treatment intensity and separately examines
presidential and congressional elections. Accordingly, their magnitudes are much more
modest than those of Haselswerdt (2017). Nonetheless, this article contributes in several ways.
First, we move beyond the Medicaid expansion
and estimate the effect of the ACA’s expansion
of private coverage. Second, by using individual
rather than aggregate data, we are able to examine how the effects differ across demographic
groups. Next, we include multiple pretreatment
periods to enable the evaluation of pre-trends.
Finally, we use a more direct intensity measure—pretreatment uninsured rate rather than
proportion low income—in an effort to obtain
more precise estimates.
Several single-state studies also explore the
impact of Medicaid prior to the ACA on turnout
and registration. Katherine Baicker and Amy
Finkelstein (2018) find that new Medicaid coverage for previously uninsured, non-elderly
adults in Oregon led to an increase in voter
turnout in the 2008 presidential election, but
not the 2010 congressional elections. They
identify the impact of Medicaid on individuals
from the random assignment of coverage generated from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment, and merge lottery assignment and
Medicaid coverage status to individual voter
data on registration and turnout. The causal
impact of individual Medicaid coverage is to
increase the individual’s likelihood of voter
turnout in 2008 by up to 2.5 percentage points
(from a baseline of roughly 33 percent), with
larger effects for some subgroups. The impact
on voter turnout in November 2010 suggests a
decline in voting, but the point estimates are
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not significant. The impact on voter registration is roughly the same magnitude as on turnout, although the results are not significant.
Haselswerdt and Jamila Michener (2019) examine major changes to TennCare that, by late
2005, led to the removal of 170,000 Medicaid
adult recipients in Tennessee. They use voter
turnout data across the ninety-five counties in
Tennessee in the 2006 and 2002 congressional
elections (which also coincided with the gubernatorial election); their point estimates imply
that for every hundred individuals who lost
TennCare coverage, between twenty-four and
thirty-six fewer individuals voted.
Although the results from these two single-
state studies suggest the same-signed direction
(expanding Medicaid leads to short-r un increases in voting, and contracting TennCare
leads to short-run decreases), the estimates are
different by an order of magnitude. Possible
explanations include heterogeneous treatment
effects across states, a lack of symmetry in the
effects of expansions and contractions, or biased estimates in the latter study from differential underlying trends in voter turnout between heavily and lightly treated Tennessee
counties.
In summary, most existing studies focus exclusively on Medicaid reforms and find mixed
effects on turnout and registration, although
the data, methods, magnitudes, and statistical
significance vary substantially. Evidence from
the previous ACA literature suggests short-run
positive impacts that fade over time; evidence
from Medicaid variation outside the ACA suggests mixed impacts.3 To date, little focus has
been on the full effect of the ACA, even though
substantial numbers of people gained private
coverage, often highly subsidized. Given that
the ACA represents a coverage expansion, we

might expect our results to be more closely
aligned to those from the Oregon study (Baicker
and Finkelstein 2018) than the Tennessee study
(Haselswerdt and Michener 2019).
Leg i s l at i v e H i s to ry

President Obama signed the ACA into law on
March 23, 2010. Although the major provisions
are well known, we highlight a number of features where the ACA could create political constituencies that affect political participation.
The ACA implemented some popular, immediate reforms in 2010 related to young adults, lifetime limits, and individuals with preexisting
conditions. The dependent coverage provision
allowed young adults to be covered by their parent’s health insurance plan until age twenty-six.
This provision affected approximately 938,000
young adults (Antwi, Moriya, and Simon 2013)
and would potentially create constituencies with
both young adults and their middle-aged parents.4 The ACA also eliminated lifetime dollar
limits on insurance coverage for essential benefits such as hospital stays. More than 16 percent
of covered workers with single coverage had a
lifetime limit of $2 million or less in 2009; overall, 59 percent had some lifetime maximum
(Claxton et al. 2009). The ACA also established
a transitional program known as the Pre-
Existing Condition Insurance Plan that launched
in summer 2010 and ended in 2014 with the major rollout of the ACA. It targeted those who were
uninsured for at least six months, had a preexisting condition, and were denied coverage by a
private insurance company.5 At its peak, in February 2013, approximately 115,000 individuals
were enrolled (CMS n.d.).
Based on the June 2012 decision in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
several major parts of the ACA were clarified.6

3. Michener (2017) examines voter turnout (and other forms of civic participation) for almost all counties in the
United States in the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections, where the key independent variable is percentage of children enrolled in Medicaid. The estimate is unlikely to be causal because it is not based on quasi-
experimental policy variation.
4. However, Jacqueline Chattopadhyay (2017) finds that young adults show virtually no signs of political feedbacks from the dependent coverage provision.
5. HealthCare.gov, “Pre-existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP), https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/pre
-existing-condition-insurance-plan-pcip (accessed January 9, 2020).
6. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
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Most important, the Supreme Court upheld the
individual mandate to buy health insurance as
a constitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing
power. It also ruled that expanding Medicaid
was not a valid exercise of Congress’s spending
power because it would coerce states to accept
the expansion or risk losing existing Medicaid
funding.
The ACA rollout in 2014 included both a private portion and a public portion. The private
portion improved the functioning of the nongroup health insurance market for consumers
who did not have access to employer-provided
or public coverage (Gruber 2011). Provisions included community rating, guaranteed issue,
and minimum coverage requirements. It also
established a health insurance marketplace,
commonly referred to as the federal exchange.
Each state was given the option of establishing
its own insurance exchange; fifteen did so in
2014 (KFF 2019b). It created penalties for those
who did not comply with the individual mandate, which could reach as high as the annual
premium for the national average price of a
bronze exchange plan. It also created sliding
scale subsidies in the form of premium tax
credits for consumers with incomes between
100 and 400 percent of the federal poverty level
(FPL) who do not qualify for other affordable
coverage, such as Medicaid. It also created cost-
sharing reductions for individuals who purchased a silver plan in the exchange and had
incomes under 250 percent of the FPL. The public portion expanded Medicaid. In states that
opted to expand Medicaid via the ACA, Medicaid is available up to 138 percent of the FPL (for
private coverage, subsidies are available for
those between 138 and 400 percent of the FPL).
This suggests a major expansion of Medicaid
eligibility via the ACA for low-income childless
adults.
Both the private and public portions of the
major ACA rollout strengthen the insurance
market, which in turn creates new constituencies that could be mobilized to vote. Although
the current uninsured are the most natural constituency from these provisions, the impact
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likely goes much further. Using administrative
data from the Internal Revenue Service for 2015,
Ithai Lurie and James Pearce (2019) classify 26.9
million non-elderly individuals as uninsured
as at a “point of interview” but a much larger
72.9 million as uninsured “ever in year.” Volatility in income, insurance affordability, family
structure, and job security put many currently
insured people at risk of losing coverage.
C o n c e p t ua l E ffec t s :
H ow Sh o u ld t h e AC A A ffec t
P o li t ica l Pa r t ici pat i o n?

Why would the expansion of the ACA impact
political participation? We draw on insights
from the civic volunteerism model (CVM),
which Kay Schlozman, Henry Brady, and Sidney
Verba (2018) summarize, to explore this issue.
The CVM explains forms of political participation (such as voter turnout or registration, volunteering time, or contributing money) as arising from three factors. The first is resources
(time, money, and civic skills). The second is
political engagement (political interest, information, efficacy, and partisanship).7 The third
is mobilization (recruitment requests that can
come through formal political campaigns or
informal social networks through which one
interacts with friends, family, neighbors, and
so on). These factors in turn interact with family background, schooling, and adult institutions, as well as particular political issues. All
three components—as well as their interactions—lead to insights for how the ACA expansions may (or may not) increase voter turnout
or registration.
When segments of the population focus on
a political issue with personal benefit, there is
potential for much greater political participation. Schlozman, Brady, and Verba (2018, 77–78)
find that “having a stake in a particular policy . . . has a strong additional impact on the
likelihood of being active on issues related to
that policy.” Specifically for voter turnout, they
find that political interest, political information, and partisan strength all have substantial
effects.8

7. Here efficacy represents the extent to which an individual believes the government listens to people like them.
8. They also find that citizenship has a substantial effect on turnout; in our empirics, we focus on the vote-eligible
population (citizens, age eighteen and older).
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This would suggest that targeted beneficiaries of the ACA might increase their voter turnout or registration because the ACA increased
their resources by providing health insurance
coverage. Of course, this depends on several
factors. First, those gaining coverage through
the ACA must value this coverage to perceive
their resources as increasing. Second, they
must also recognize that this gain in coverage
is due to the ACA. Third, it depends on how the
increase in resources interacts with the other
factors in the CVM. For example, if the other
factors tend to push an individual away from
voting, then an increase in resources would
have to be large enough to convince this individual to vote.
Political engagement is particularly important in influencing turnout. One element of engagement is information. As mentioned, potential voters gaining coverage via the ACA may or
may not associate this benefit with the ACA. For
example, Jacqueline Chattopadhyay (2017)
shows that the ACA dependent care provision
does not affect political participation of young
people, perhaps because the coverage is provided through employer-provided rather than
public plans. Similarly, it is possible that those
who purchased subsidized private coverage in
the ACA marketplace did not associate the low
premiums they received with the ACA.9
Why would an individual gaining coverage
through the ACA not attribute this benefit to
the ACA? An answer can be found in the concept of the “delegated” or “submerged” welfare
state (Mettler 2011; Morgan and Campbell 2011).
The concept suggests that those gaining public
benefits may not be fully aware that they are
receiving them from a public program. This
stems from the fact that it is becoming increasingly common for public goods to be provided
privately, thus obscuring whether the goods
themselves are public or private. Someone gaining insurance via a subsidized Marketplace
plan administered by a private insurance company, such as Anthem or United, for example,

may not consider the coverage to be public. If
this is the case, then we may not expect those
benefiting from the ACA to respond by changing their political participation.
Another component of political engagement
is efficacy. It is also possible that the programs
lack efficacy, signaling that the government
does not listen to or care about people like the
beneficiary. The individual mandate may be
seen as negative, as an infringement on personal liberty, even though the intent is to help
consumers by stabilizing insurance markets
from adverse selection. Although millions of
poor individuals signed up for Medicaid in expansion states, the program itself may be
viewed as stigmatizing or poorly run, in turn
sending a message to beneficiaries that they do
not deserve a voice in politics. Michener (2017)
argues that the Medicaid program conveys disempowering messages.10
The third factor in the CVM is mobilization
(see Rosenstone and Hansen 2002). Mobilization efforts on both sides of the political debate
surrounding the ACA have been ongoing since
before 2010. Those who earn a living in the
health-care sector may experience greater mobilization given that changes to health policy
may affect them both personally and professionally. Organizations such as the American
Medical Association and the American Association of Retired Persons, as well as lobbyists
associated with the pharmaceutical industry
and the insurance industry, are also involved in
mobilization efforts. Presumably, these sorts of
efforts will differentially affect different types
of individuals.
As suggested, it is important to consider
the interaction of these three factors rather
than each in isolation. For example, even if
Medicaid is viewed as efficacious and the information about the ACA’s role in providing
the benefit is understood, some constituencies lack resources to translate increased information into higher political participation.
Schlozman, Brady, and Verba (2018) find evi-

9. Of those enrolled in Marketplace coverage in 2018, fully 87 percent received a premium tax credit and 53
percent received cost-sharing reductions (for more, see Kaiser Family Foundation 2019a).
10. The question of whether Medicaid sends a stigmatizing message is debatable. Recent surveys have found
that 74 percent of the public, including a majority of Democrats (84 percent), Independents (76 percent), and
Republicans (61 percent) look favorably on Medicaid (Zirzinger, Wu, and Brodie 2017).
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dence that recipients of means-tested benefits, who tend to have less education and lower
income, are relatively uninterested in and uninformed about politics. The bump given to
their political participation by their interest in
issues is not enough to overcome their other
resource deficits, such as lack of time or
money. Similarly, even if the ACA improved financial security or health status for Medicaid
beneficiaries (thus, increasing resources to
new beneficiaries), the gain in resources may
not have been enough to increase political
participation, given the initial resource deficits. For private coverage, the effects on resources is less clear. Gaining private coverage
would also improve financial security, although some beneficiaries choose plans that
entail substantial out-of-pocket costs (Pauly
2017). Thus, private coverage reduces the risk
an individual faces (and affects the variance of
expenses), but the mean effect on expenditure
may not change substantially. In sum, the
CVM suggests important interrelated factors
that influence the effect of the ACA on voter
turnout.
Data

Our principal dataset is the 2006 to 2016 Voting
and Registration Supplement to the CPS, produced in November of even-numbered years.
Aram Hur and Christopher Achen (2013) argue
that this supplement is widely respected and
often used for studying voting behavior given
to its data quality, sample sizes, and response
rates. We restrict our empirical analysis to the
vote-eligible population (VEP).11 The CPS asks
a number of questions about voter behavior; we
focus primarily on voter turnout, worded as “In
any election some people are not able to vote
because they are sick or busy or have some
other reason, and others do not want to vote.
Did (you/name) vote in the election held on
Tuesday, November ——?” In some specifica-
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tions, we examine whether the ACA affected
voter registration, derived from the CPS question “(Were you/Was name) registered to vote
in the November —— election?”
In our primary analysis, we follow conventional academic coding rules by restricting the
VEP sample who answer the turnout question
with yes or no, excluding individuals who respond with don’t know, refused, and no response. Official Census Bureau reports categorize these answers into no, in part to due to
well-known overreporting of voting driven by
social desirability bias (Ansolabehere and
Hersh 2012). Following the recommendation of
Hur and Achen (2013), we drop all categories of
missing turnout response, and adjust the CPS
survey weights for overreporting using files
from the United States Elections Project.12
The CPS is well suited to studying the full
impact of the ACA on voter turnout using an
approach similar to that of Courtemanche and
his colleagues (2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b)
because it provides geographical information
at the state level for all respondents, and at the
county level for approximately 40 percent of respondents. Over the entire 2006 to 2016 period,
the CPS identifies 368 counties within the
United States; however, only 193 are consistently identified across all six surveys. These
193 tend to be relatively large and represent
around 38 percent of the total U.S. population,
the average county population being around
615,000 (approximately nine times larger than
the counties or county-equivalents that are not
identified). Following earlier work, we create a
“rest of state” category for respondents who are
either in an unidentified county or in one of the
175 counties identified only intermittently from
2006 to 2016. Ultimately, we have 242 geographic
areas in our analysis. Among the vote-eligible
population, we extract questions on voter participation and registration along with demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.

11. Individuals are vote eligible if they report themselves as citizens and age eighteen or older. In practice, we
restrict our sample in several other ways, most importantly by confining our analysis to non-elderly adults.
12. United States Elections Project, “CPS Vote Over-Report and Non-Response Bias Correction,” 1994–2016,
http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/cps-methodology (accessed January 9, 2020). Other examples
of reweighting to account for underreporting include Bradley Hardy, Timothy Smeeding, and James Ziliak (2018),
who examine SNAP participation, and Robert Hartley, Carlos Lamarche, and Ziliak (2017), who examine AFDC/
TANF participation.
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The covariates include respondent’s age, marital status, sex, educational attainment, race,
employment status, and family income. We
also control for whether the respondent self-
reported voting status.13
We append a number of health policy variables that vary at the state or substate level to
the CPS microdata. One key variable is pretreatment uninsured rate. For each of the local
areas, we use the 2013 Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE) to compute the uninsured rate for adults age eighteen through
sixty-four, as well as smaller subgroups age
eighteen through thirty-nine, forty through
forty-nine, and fifty through sixty-four, when
appropriate (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). Variation in the rate of uninsured adults age eighteen through sixty-four across areas is substantial, varying from 5.3 percent to 51.1 percent,
rates for younger adults being somewhat
higher and those for older adults somewhat
lower. Another important variable, commonly
used in ACA studies, indicates the state-
optional Medicaid expansions. Following
Courtemanche and his colleagues (2018a), we
code twenty-one states as non-expansion if
they had not expanded by early 2015. According
to the Kaiser Family Foundation (2019c),
twenty-eight states (including the District of
Columbia) participated in the Medicaid expansion in 2014, two others implemented in early
2015.
We also include several economic and political variables. One is the unemployment rate
(which varies by local area and year) from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018). The local unemployment rate ranges from 2.0 percent to
17.2 percent. We also parameterize three political variables related to the voting process,
each of which varies by state and year. The first
relates to voter identification laws. We follow
the National Conference for State Legislatures
(NCSL) in classifying states in each election
year as having strict laws requiring photo IDs,
nonstrict laws requiring photo IDs, strict laws
requiring nonphoto IDs, nonstrict laws requir-

ing nonphoto IDs, or no ID requirement (Underhill 2020). For the 2018 election, thirty-five
states had laws requesting or requiring voters
to show some form of identification at the
polls. The remaining fifteen states use other
methods to verify voters, such as checking a
signature against information on file. In our
primary specification, we control for states not
having any ID requirement. Between 2006 and
2016, the number of states that adopted an ID
requirement steadily grew from twenty-three
to thirty-three. We also use the NCSL (2019b)
to classify states with early voting. We explored
definitions of early voting, which in Paul
Gronke, Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Peter
Miller (2007) mean no-excuse in-person early
voting, no-excuse absentee, vote-by-mail, or in-
person absentee voting. The number of states
with early voting has remained nearly constant, thirty-six in 2006 and thirty-eight in 2016.
Finally, a recent innovation to voting is automatic registration; some states automatically
register a person to vote, unless the person actively decides to opt-out of voter registration
(NCSL 2019b). Although seventeen states and
the District of Columbia authorized automatic
registration by December 2018, only Georgia
and Oregon implemented such laws in time for
the 2016 election (Brennan Center for Justice
2019).
Virtually all studies recognize that competitiveness of elections and coattail effects from
presidential, senatorial, or gubernatorial elections are likely to affect voter turnout (see, for
example, Clinton and Sances 2018; Haselswerdt
and Michener 2019). We control at the state-
year level for a number of variables related to
competitiveness, coattails, and partisanship.
First, following Clinton and Sances (2018), we
separately estimate the impact of the ACA for
congressional elections (2006, 2010, and 2014)
and presidential elections (2008, 2012, and
2016). Second, for every state and year in our
sample, we control for (when available) the difference in aggregate vote percentage for the
candidates finishing in first and second place

13. These covariates, including family income, are commonly in individual-level analyses of voter turnout with
the CPS VRS (see, for example, Holbein and Hillygus 2016). We have rerun our specifications excluding family
income and employment status, and none of the conclusions change.
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Table 1. Voter Participation Across Elections
Congressional Elections

Age eighteen and older
Age eighteen through thirty-nine
Age forty through forty-nine
Age fifty through sixty-four
Age sixty-five and older
White
Nonwhite
Income under $50K
Income $50K or more
Medicaid expansion state
Non-expansion state
High uninsured state
Low uninsured state
Medicaid expansion, high uninsured
Medicaid expansion, low uninsured
Non-expansion, high uninsured
Non-expansion, low uninsured

Presidential Elections

2006

2010

2014

2008

2012

2016

47.8%
32.0
49.7
60.2
62.5
51.6
36.7
40.7
57.8
49.6
45.1
45.8
50.5
48.7
50.2
43.6
52.1

45.5%
29.9
46.8
56.6
60.8
48.6
37.4
38.4
52.5
46.9
43.5
44.9
46.5
47.7
46.3
42.7
47.4

41.9%
25.9
40.9
51.7
59.4
45.8
33.1
34.6
48.2
41.8
42.1
41.1
43.1
41.5
42.1
40.9
48.1

63.6%
55.5
64.9
70.1
70.3
66.1
56.8
55.0
75.3
63.9
63.2
62.4
65.3
62.9
64.6
62.1
68.7

61.8%
50.5
63.2
69.2
72.0
64.1
56.1
53.8
69.1
61.8
61.8
60.1
64.3
59.4
63.6
60.5
67.8

61.4%
51.2
63.1
67.1
70.9
65.3
52.7
52.2
68.2
61.6
61.1
59.9
63.6
60.0
62.8
59.8
67.7

Source: Authors’ tabulations of the Voter Registration Supplement from the 2006 to 2016 Current
Population Survey.
Note: All percentages represent voter participation. Invalid voting responses coded as nonparticipation
(File 2015, 2018). Medicaid expansion states are those that implemented an expansion for new adults
by 2015. Low uninsured states are those that had an uninsured rate below the median state in 2013
(15.3 percent, obtained from the 2013 SAHIE).

for presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial
elections.14 Third, we control for a state’s partisanship by computing the difference in a state’s
Republican vote percentage and Democrat vote
percentage using the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, prior to our CPS sample. We interact this state-level characteristic with year
dummies in all specifications.
Table 1 characterizes voter participation in
the CPS over time for the full population age
eighteen and older, as well as by age group,
Medicaid expansion status, and pretreatment
uninsured rate. To preserve comparability with
published Census Bureau reports (File 2015,
2018), we recode invalid voting responses as
nonparticipation. Over the period examined,
participation was approximately 17 percentage

points higher in presidential elections than
congressional elections; on average, approximately 45.1 percent participate in congressional
elections and 62.3 percent in presidential elections. The highest participation was in the 2008
election, when 63.6 percent of the vote-eligible
population participated. Participation increases markedly with age, especially in congressional elections. On average, the youngest
group (age eighteen through thirty-nine) had a
52.4 percent turnout in presidential elections,
compared with 71.1 percent for those age sixty-
five and older. The youngest group also had
substantially lower comparative participation
in congressional elections; the gap in voter participation for those age eighteen through thirty-
nine was 23.1 percentage points (29.3 percent

14. The difference is usually computed from the vote percentages for the Democrat and Republican candidates.
When no relevant race took place within a given state-year cell, we code the difference as 0, and also include a
dummy variable for that race occurred.
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Figure 1. Voter Participation in Local Areas, by Rates

.75

Voter Participation

.65
Presidential elections

.55

.45
Congressional elections

.35

.25
2006

2008

2010

Highest uninsured areas

2012

2014

2016

Lowest uninsured areas

Source: Authors’ tabulations from the 2006 to 2016 CPS using weighting corrections (Hur and Achen
2013).
Note: Local areas are in the top 10 percent of uninsured if the rate of uninsured is above 27.4 percent.
Local areas are in the bottom 10 percent of uninsured if the rate of uninsured is below 11.5 percent.

versus 52.4 percent), relative to just 10.2 percentage points (60.9 percent versus 71.1 percent) for those age sixty-five and older. States
that expanded Medicaid by 2015 (expansion
states) had somewhat higher participation
rates in congressional elections than non-
expansion states, but virtually no difference in
presidential elections. States with below-
median uninsured rates had higher participation in all elections.
As to the impact of the ACA, table 1 reveals
that the overall effect may be small and sensitive to the type of election. Voter participation
in presidential elections is remarkably stable,
though somewhat higher in the historic 2008
election. Voter participation has steadily declined in congressional elections for many demographic groups; in addition, disparities in
participation across demographic groups are
significant (File 2015). Voter participation drops
off more pronouncedly for Medicaid expansion
states relative to non-expansion states after

ACA implementation in 2014. However, in the
group of states with low uninsured rates (where
the impact of the ACA should be smaller), we
continue to see much larger voter participation
changes in Medicaid expansion states compared with non-expansion states. This potentially suggests that the expansions are not responsible for the decline in voter participation.
Figure 1 draws on the CPS sample used in
the empirical analysis (described further). Localities with low uninsured rates clearly have
higher voter turnout than those with high
rates.15 However, difference is minimal in the
trends from the pre to post period for either
presidential or congressional elections.
Table 2 shows health insurance coverage,
derived from the SAHIE for 2011 through 2016.
Overall, insurance coverage increased in 2014
on implementation of the full ACA provisions
and continued to increase through 2016. Coverage gains were larger among younger, nonwhite, or less affluent adults. States that elected

15. The threshold for being in the lowest 10 percent of uninsured rates for an area was 11.4 percent. The threshold for the highest 10 percent was 27.5 percent.
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Table 2. Health Insurance Coverage of Non-Elderly Adults, SAHIE (Various Years)
Pre-ACA

Age eighteen through sixty-four
Age eighteen through thirty-nine
Age forty through forty-nine
Age fifty through sixty-four
White
Nonwhite
Income ≤ 400% FPL
Income > 400% FPL
Medicaid expansion state
Non-expansion state
High uninsured state
Low uninsured state
Medicaid expansion, high uninsured state
Medicaid expansion, low uninsured state
Non-expansion, high uninsured state
Non-expansion, low uninsured state
Medicaid expansion, ≤138% FPL
Medicaid expansion, >138% FPL
Non-expansion, ≤138% FPL
Non-expansion, >138% FPL

Post-ACA

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

78.9%
73.6
80.5
85.5
84.9
68.2
69.8
93.4
81.2
75.4
74.9
84.6
76.6
84.7
73.6
84.2
63.4
85.8
53.2
82.1

79.2%
74.4
80.6
85.4
85.2
68.9
70.4
93.5
81.5
75.8
75.3
85.0
76.8
85.1
74.1
84.3
64.1
86.0
54.5
82.2

79.6%
75.0
80.8
85.4
85.5
69.5
71.0
93.3
81.8
76.1
75.7
85.1
77.4
85.3
74.4
84.3
65.1
86.1
55.6
82.2

83.6%
79.7
84.4
88.8
88.5
75.5
76.6
94.7
86.3
79.5
80.5
88.2
83.6
88.4
78.1
86.7
73.8
89.4
61.0
84.9

86.8%
83.6
87.2
91.2
91.1
79.9
80.8
95.6
89.7
82.4
84.1
90.7
87.9
91.1
81.1
88.9
80.4
91.9
65.3
87.1

87.9%
85.3
88.0
91.7
91.8
81.7
82.2
95.9
90.9
83.4
85.4
91.7
89.4
92.1
82.2
89.3
83.0
92.7
67.3
87.5

Source: Authors’ tabulations of the 2011 to 2016 model-based small area health insurance estimates.
Note: Neither children nor senior citizens included in calculations. See https://www.census.gov/data/
datasets/time-series/demo/sahie/estimates-acs.html and https://www2.census.gov/programssurveys/sahie/technical-documentation/file-layouts/sahie-file-layout-2008-2017.pdf (accessed March
5, 2020).

to expand Medicaid in 2014 (or early 2015) had
higher baseline insurance levels, and exhibited
larger overall gains in coverage after implementation. The impact of the ACA was most dramatic in states that expanded Medicaid and
had a high baseline uninsured rate. The bottom
part of table shows the growth in coverage for
the newly eligible adults (near-poor adults,
those living under 138 percent of the FPL) and
all other adults in both expansion and non-
expansion states. Without question, near-poor
individuals in expansion states saw the greatest
increase in coverage—14.9 percentage points
on average, translating into insurance gains of
nearly 2.4 million non-elderly adults. However,
other groups—near-p oor adults in non-
expansion states, and higher-income adults in
both expansion and non-expansion states—
also experienced significant growth. Insurance
gains for near-poor adults in non-expansion

states were approximately 1.2 million (10.1 percentage points). Gains for higher-income adults
from private coverage were approximately 7.2
million or 5.4 percentage points in expansion
states, and 4.8 million or 4.3 percentage points
in non-expansion states. Overall, the insurance
gains for near-poor, non-elderly adults in Medicaid expansion states made up approximately
15 percent of all gains.
For our empirical work, starting from an initial 2006 through 2016 CPS sample of 914,152
respondents, we restrict attention to the 567,706
respondents in the vote-eligible population,
that is, respondents age eighteen or older who
are citizens of the United States. The sample is
further restricted to the 490,053 respondents
who provide yes or no answers to the voting
question (Hur and Achen 2013). We remove a
few respondents when we could not derive a
local unemployment rate, as well as individuals
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who had missing values for family income, leaving a sample of 465,517 respondents. Finally, we
exclude individuals older than sixty-four because the ACA was not intended to affect the
health-care coverage of seniors (Courtemanche
et al. 2017), leaving 371,015 respondents.
Table 3 shows selected summary statistics
for the remaining CPS sample, as well as by year
(full results in table A1).16 There are large swings
in voter turnout across congressional and presidential elections, but more muted swings in
registration. Approximately 60 percent of respondents lived in a state that expanded Medicaid. The local unemployment rate rises until
2010, and then decreases after. Approximately
56 percent of respondents self-report their voting and registration status; 44 percent had another respondent report voting and registration
for them.
E m p i r ica l F r a m e wo r k

We estimate both DD models examining the
impact of the Medicaid expansions alone and
DDD models that isolate both the public and
private portions of the ACA. The DD specification takes the form
   Vist = β0 + β1(MEDICAIDs * POSTt ) + β2 Xist
+ β3 Pst + αs + τt + εist,

(1)

where Vist is an indicator for whether individual
i living in state s voted in election year t, MEDICAIDs indicates whether state s participated in
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, POSTt indicates
whether time t is in the posttreatment period
(2014 or later), Xist is the set of individual-level
controls discussed, Pst is the set of state-level
political variables, αs and τt are the state and
election year fixed effects, and εist is the error
term. Expansions states are those that adopted
in 2014 or early 2015, and the posttreatment period does not count for the specific timing of
the expansion (see Courtemanche et al. 2019a).
We do not include the MEDICAIDs and POSTt
dummies separately because they are subsumed by the state and year fixed effects. The
coefficient of interest is β1, which represents the
average effect of the Medicaid expansion on

residents of expansion states. Standard errors
are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering
by state.
The DDD model adds a third layer of variation: pre-ACA uninsured rates across counties.
This approach is based on the idea that areas
where a greater percentage of residents are uninsured experience larger treatments from
large-scale health insurance expansions (see
Courtemanche et al. 2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2019a,
2019b). The model is
Vicst = γ0 + γ1(MEDICAIDs * POSTt )
+ γ2(UNINSUREDc * POSTt )
+ γ3(UNINSUREDc * MEDICAIDs * POSTt )
+ γ4 Xicst + γ5 Pst + θc + σt + μicst ,
(2)

where UNINSUREDc is the time-invariant pre-
ACA uninsured rate in county c, θc and σt are
county and year fixed effects, and μicst is the error term. In non-Medicaid expansion states, the
effect of the ACA is given by γ2 * UNINSUREDc ,
We are especially interested in γ2 * UNINSUREDc ,
which is the effect at the mean county pretreatment uninsured rate in our sample. Similarly,
the effect of the Medicaid expansion is γ3 * UNINSUREDc , and its effect at the average pretreatment uninsured rate is γ3 * UNINSUREDc . The
impact of the “full ACA”—that is, both the Medicaid expansion and the so-called private portion of the law that was implemented in all
states—is therefore the sum of these terms,
which is (γ2 + γ3) * UNINSUREDc with (γ2 + γ3) *
UNINSUREDc being the total effect at the mean
pre-ACA uninsured rate.
The key identifying assumption behind the
impact of the Medicaid expansion in our DD
model is that, conditional on the other control
variables, any changes in voter turnout would
have been the same in Medicaid expansion and
non-expansion states had the expansion not occurred. Our DDD model, on the other hand, has
separate key identifying assumptions for the
impact of the Medicaid expansion and for the
impact of the private components of the ACA.
The identifying assumption behind the impact
of the Medicaid expansion in our DDD model
is that, in the absence of the ACA, the differen-

16. All supplemental appendix tables, designated in text with a leading A, are available via the online appendix
at https://www.rsfjournal.org/content/6/2/179/tab-supplemental.
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Table 3. Selected Summary Statistics from the 2006 to 2016 CPS Voter Registration Supplement

Voted?
Registered to vote?
Post 2013?
Percent 2013 uninsured
Age eighteen through sixty-four
Age eighteen through thirty-nine
Age forty through forty-nine
Age fifty through sixty-four
State expanded Medicaid?
Local unemployment rate
No ID required to vote
State allows early voting
Automatic voter registration
Republican vote margin
No governor race
No presidential race
No Senate race
Governor race margin
Presidential race margin
Senate race margin
Sample size

All Years

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

0.475
(0.499)
0.714
(0.452)
0.354
(0.478)

0.385
(0.486)
0.689
(0.463)
0
(0)

0.615
(0.487)
0.743
(0.437)
0
(0)

0.384
(0.486)
0.697
(0.459)
0
(0)

0.567
(0.496)
0.728
(0.445)
0
(0)

0.324
(0.468)
0.688
(0.463)
1
(0)

0.576
(0.494)
0.736
(0.441)
1
(0)

0.201
(0.063)
0.245
(0.071)
0.189
(0.063)
0.146
(0.05)
0.599
(0.49)
0.066
(0.023)
0.472
(0.499)
0.708
(0.455)
0.008
(0.089)
2.08
(15.07)
0.54
(0.50)
0.50
(0.50)
0.33
(0.47)
6.51
(10.36)
7.56
(10.59)
12.88
(14.38)
371,015

0.2
(0.063)
0.244
(0.071)
0.188
(0.063)
0.145
(0.049)
0.602
(0.49)
0.046
(0.01)
0.533
(0.499)
0.698
(0.459)
0
(0)
2.22
(15.01)
0.21
(0.41)
1.00
(0.00)
0.26
(0.44)
13.94
(12.02)
0.00
(0.00)
16.67
(15.72)
59,107

0.201
(0.063)
0.245
(0.071)
0.189
(0.062)
0.146
(0.049)
0.599
(0.49)
0.058
(0.013)
0.508
(0.5)
0.704
(0.457)
0
(0)
2.19
(14.97)
0.87
(0.34)
0.00
(0.00)
0.47
(0.50)
2.49
(8.85)
14.92
(9.41)
10.47
(13.78)
56,586

0.201
(0.063)
0.245
(0.071)
0.189
(0.063)
0.145
(0.05)
0.603
(0.489)
0.096
(0.02)
0.495
(0.5)
0.693
(0.461)
0
(0)
1.91
(15.05)
0.21
(0.41)
1.00
(0.00)
0.27
(0.44)
9.58
(9.91)
0.00
(0.00)
12.76
(13.51)
64,125

0.201
(0.064)
0.245
(0.072)
0.189
(0.064)
0.146
(0.051)
0.596
(0.491)
0.08
(0.017)
0.465
(0.499)
0.693
(0.461)
0
(0)
2.06
(15.10)
0.85
(0.36)
0.00
(0.00)
0.26
(0.44)
1.59
(5.42)
14.97
(9.96)
13.97
(13.08)
65,488

0.202
(0.064)
0.246
(0.072)
0.19
(0.063)
0.146
(0.05)
0.596
(0.491)
0.062
(0.013)
0.451
(0.498)
0.717
(0.45)
0
(0)
2.08
(15.12)
0.22
(0.41)
1.00
(0.00)
0.47
(0.50)
10.93
(11.30)
0.00
(0.00)
9.89
(15.52)
63,718

0.202
(0.063)
0.246
(0.071)
0.19
(0.062)
0.146
(0.049)
0.596
(0.491)
0.049
(0.01)
0.398
(0.489)
0.741
(0.438)
0.044
(0.206)
2.07
(15.15)
0.86
(0.35)
0.00
(0.00)
0.28
(0.45)
1.23
(5.21)
15.09
(11.88)
13.69
(13.61)
61,991

Source: Authors’ tabulation using weighting corrections (Hur and Achen 2013).
Note: Restricted to vote-eligible population age eighteen to sixty-four who answered the voting question.
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tials in voter turnout between high and low
baseline uninsured rate areas in Medicaid expansion states would have evolved similarly to
these differentials in non-expansion states. The
identifying assumption behind the impact of
the private (national) components of the ACA
in our DDD model is that, in the absence of the
ACA, any changes in our outcomes of interest
would not have varied differentially by local
area uninsured rates, conditional on the controls. The DDD approach also requires potentially restrictive functional form assumptions:
the intensity of treatment is assumed to vary
linearly with the pretreatment uninsured rate,
and the ACA is assumed to have no causal impact in a (hypothetical) county with no uninsured people. Accordingly, we consider γ1—the
effect of expanding Medicaid at a 0 percent uninsured rate—to represent unobserved state-
level confounders rather than part of Medicaid’s causal effect.
In both the DD and DDD models, our identification strategy assumes that areas gaining
more insurance coverage would potentially
have more mobilization (and the conceptual
model suggests that the mobilization would
come mostly from those who gained coverage),
but nothing in our identification strategy constrains that to be the case. For example, areas
with higher uninsured rates are also likely to
have a larger portion of the insured population
at risk for losing coverage, and they too could
be mobilized to vote. To the extent that individuals are mobilized by the ACA but not geographically concentrated (as could be the case
for sicker individuals with preexisting conditions or young adults covered by the dependent
coverage mandate), our approach will not capture such mobilization.
Mai n R e s u lt s

Table 4 presents the regression results for our
DD model. Columns (1) and (2) report results
for the years of congressional elections (2006,
2010, and 2014), while columns (3) and (4) report the results for the presidential election
years (2008, 2012, and 2016). The reason for this
stratification is that the enormous differences
in voter turnout between presidential and midterm elections documented in table 3 raise the
possibility that the causal effect of the ACA

could differ in the two types of elections. Because we only have one posttreatment year for
both types (2014 for congressional, 2016 for
presidential), it will not be possible to distinguish between differential effects by election
type and effects that dissipate over time. Columns (2) and (4) include time-varying political
variables that control for voter identification
laws, early voting laws, and automatic registration; columns (1) and (3) do not.
We report results both for the full sample of
non-elderly adults and subsamples for race-
ethnicity (non-Hispanic white versus other),
age (eighteen through thirty-nine, forty through
forty-nine, and fifty through sixty-four), and income (less than and more than $50,000). We
use the SAHIE pretreatment uninsured rates
that correspond to each subsample. This is why,
for instance, we do not stratify further within
the age eighteen through thirty-nine category,
because that is the narrowest age range for
which SAHIE insurance information is available. Table 4 presents only the coefficient estimate representing the impact of the ACA Medicaid expansion (for all other covariates,
excluding geographic controls, see tables A2
and A3).
In the full sample regression results presented in the top panel of table 4, the coefficient estimate in column (1) indicates that the
Medicaid expansion reduced voter turnout in
congressional elections by 4.0 percentage
points (p-value = 0.121) relative to a base of
around 38 percent, though the p-value associated with this coefficient suggests that it is not
statistically significant at conventional levels.
When we include political controls in column
(2), this estimate falls to a 3.5 percentage point
reduction (p-value = 0.160) in voter turnout in
congressional elections. For presidential elections, column (3) suggests that the Medicaid
expansion led to a 1.1 percentage point increase
(p-value = 0.179) in turnout from a base of
around 60 percent. When we include political
controls in column (4), this estimate falls to a
0.9 percentage point increase (p-value = 0.289).
Thus none of our full sample DD estimates suggest a statistically significant impact of the
Medicaid expansion on turnout in either congressional or presidential elections.
Turning to our subsample DD results, we for
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Medicaid
Medicaid
Medicaid
Medicaid
Medicaid
Medicaid
Medicaid
Medicaid

Full
White
Nonwhite
Age eighteen through thirty-nine
Age forty through forty-nine
Age fifty through sixty-four
Income less than $50K
Income $50K or more

–.040 (.025)
–.040 (.027)
–.044* (.025)
–.029 (.025)
–.052** (.025)
–.045 (.030)
–.042* (.023)
–.041 (.029)

(1)
–.035
–.035
–.043*
–.024
–.044*
–.044
–.040*
–.034

(.025)
(.027)
(.025)
(.024)
(.024)
(.030)
(.022)
(.029)

(2)

Congressional Election

.011 (.008)
–.007 (.009)
.038** (.017)
.021 (.013)
–.009 (.014)
.01
(.013)
.017 (.014)
.003 (.008)

(3)

.009 (.009)
–.009 (.009)
.035** (.017)
.020 (.014)
–.009 (.016)
.008 (.013)
.014 (.015)
.003 (.009)

(4)

Presidential Election

Source: Authors’ tabulation based on the 2006 to 2016 Current Population Survey Voter Registration Supplement.
Note: All models run as linear probability models on the vote-eligible population (age eighteen and older, citizens), using sample weights modified in accordance
with Hur and Achen (2013). Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the state level. All specifications include controls for respondent’s age (three
groups, eighteen through thirty-nine, forty through forty-nine, fifty through sixty-four), marital status, sex, educational attainment, race (white, African American
or black, Hispanic or Latino), employment status, income category (sixteen groups), and whether the respondent self-reported voting status. All specifications
include year fixed effects, area fixed effects, local unemployment rate, partisanship and competitiveness. Columns (1) and (2) restrict to congressional elections
in 2006, 2010, and 2014, while columns (3) and (4) restrict to presidential elections in 2008, 2012, and 2016. Columns (2) and (4) include political variables,
controlling for voter identification laws, early voting laws, and automatic registration (and varying at the state-year level). Sample restricted to non-elderly
adults. Pretreatment uninsured rate, obtained from the SAHIE for 2013, is defined for relevant age group at the local level.
CPS Sample sizes: Full sample (N = 186,950 congressional; 184,065 presidential); white (N = 141,564 congressional; 137,397 presidential); nonwhite (N = 45,386
congressional; 46,668 presidential); age eighteen through thirty-nine (N = 80,508 congressional; 80,058 presidential); age forty through forty-nine (N = 42,350
congressional; 40,270 presidential); age fifty through sixty-four (N = 64,092 congressional; 63,737 presidential); income less than $50K (N = 80,497 congressional; 74,462 presidential); income $50K or more (N = 106,453 congressional; 109,603 presidential).
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
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Table 5. Voter Turnout, Implied Effects for DDD Specification
Congressional Election
Treatment

(1)

Presidential Election

(2)

(3)

(4)

Full sample
Private
Medicaid
Full

0.042
–0.031
0.011

(0.037)
(0.044)
(0.027)

0.036
–0.036
0.000

(0.038)
(0.044)
(0.024)

–0.019
0.028
0.009

(0.013)
(0.018)
(0.012)

–0.023* (0.013)
0.027 (0.020)
0.004 (0.015)

White
Private
Medicaid
Full

0.035
–0.003
0.032

(0.051)
(0.060)
(0.034)

0.028
–0.010
0.018

(0.051)
(0.059)
(0.031)

0.015
0.001
0.017

(0.017)
(0.024)
(0.015)

0.013
–0.008
0.005

(0.016)
(0.024)
(0.019)

Nonwhite
Private
Medicaid
Full

0.054** (0.026)
–0.088** (0.036)
–0.034 (0.023)

0.053* (0.027)
–0.092** (0.036)
–0.040* (0.022)

0.008
0.047
0.055

(0.020)
(0.044)
(0.036)

0.002
0.064
0.066

(0.022)
(0.055)
(0.048)

Age eighteen through
thirty-nine
Private
Medicaid
Full

0.055
–0.035
0.020

(0.043)
(0.052)
(0.032)

0.048
–0.040
0.007

(0.045)
(0.052)
(0.029)

–0.017
0.028
0.011

(0.021)
(0.030)
(0.022)

–0.024
0.033
0.009

(0.022)
(0.035)
(0.028)

Age forty through forty-nine
Private
Medicaid
Full

0.047
–0.037
0.010

(0.037)
(0.054)
(0.039)

0.039
–0.054
–0.015

(0.036)
(0.046)
(0.029)

0.014
–0.026
–0.012

(0.020)
(0.025)
(0.015)

0.015
–0.024
–0.009

(0.020)
(0.025)
(0.017)

Age fifty through sixty-four
Private
Medicaid
Full

0.029
–0.034
–0.005

(0.040)
(0.046)
(0.023)

0.026
–0.032
–0.006

(0.041)
(0.047)
(0.023)

–0.032
0.050
0.018

(0.022)
(0.030)
(0.017)

–0.033
0.037
0.003

(0.022)
(0.030)
(0.019)

Income less than $50K
Private
Medicaid
Full

0.031
–0.034
–0.003

(0.039)
(0.046)
(0.027)

0.025
–0.034
–0.009

(0.040)
(0.046)
(0.026)

–0.018
–0.007
–0.025

(0.017)
(0.027)
(0.020)

–0.022
–0.012
–0.033

(0.017)
(0.030)
(0.025)

the most part observe modest and statistically
insignificant effects with a few notable exceptions. The Medicaid expansion led to a statistically significant 4.3 to 4.4 percentage point reduction in voter turnout among nonwhites in
congressional elections, but a statistically significant 3.5 to 3.8 percentage point increase in
presidential elections. Although we see no statistically significant difference in the impact of
the Medicaid expansion on turnout in presidential elections by age, we do observe a statistically significant 4.4 to 5.2 percentage point
decrease in congressional elections for those

age forty to forty-nine. We also observe a statistically significant 4.0 to 4.2 percentage point
decrease in turnout among lower-income individuals in our sample in congressional elections, but no statistically significant difference
by income in presidential elections.
Table 5 presents the regression results for
our DDD model in a similar format to the DD
results in table 4. One difference is that the
rows in table 5 report the implied effects of the
private portion of the ACA, the Medicaid expansion, and the full ACA (private + Medicaid) at
the mean pretreatment uninsured rate. Table 5
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Table 5. (continued)
Congressional Election
Treatment

(1)

Income $50K or more
Private
Medicaid
Full

0.058* (0.034)
–0.039 (0.044)
0.019 (0.030)

Presidential Election

(2)

0.051
–0.047
0.004

(0.036)
(0.044)
(0.027)

(3)

–0.018
(0.018)
0.053** (0.022)
0.035*** (0.012)

(4)

–0.021 (0.017)
0.052** (0.023)
0.032** (0.015)

Source: Authors’ tabulation based on the 2006 to 2016 Current Population Survey Voter Registration Supplement.
Note: All models run as linear probability models on the vote-eligible population (age eighteen and older,
citizens), using sample weights modified in accordance with Hur and Achen (2013). Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the state level. All specifications include controls for respondent’s age (three groups,
eighteen through thirty-nine, forty through forty-nine, fifty through sixty-four), marital status, sex, educational
attainment, race (white, African American or black, Hispanic or Latino), employment status, income category
(sixteen groups), and whether the respondent self-reported voting status. All specifications include year fixed
effects, area fixed effects, local unemployment rate, partisanship and competitiveness. Columns (1) and (2)
restrict to congressional elections in 2006, 2010, and 2014, while columns (3) and (4) restrict to presidential
elections in 2008, 2012, and 2016. Columns (2) and (4) include political variables, controlling for voter identification laws, early voting laws, and automatic registration (and varying at the state-year level). Sample restricted
to non-elderly adults. Pretreatment uninsured rate, obtained from the SAHIE for 2013, is defined for relevant
age group at the local level.
CPS Sample sizes: Full sample (N = 186,950 congressional; 184,065 presidential); white (N = 141,564 congressional; 137,397 presidential); nonwhite (N = 45,386 congressional; 46,668 presidential); age eighteen through
thirty-nine (N = 80,508 congressional; 80,058 presidential); age forty through forty-nine (N = 42,350 congressional; 40,270 presidential); fifty through sixty-four (N = 64,092 congressional; 63,737 presidential); income
less than $50K (N = 80,497 congressional; 74,462 presidential); income $50K or more (N = 106,453 congressional; 109,603 presidential).
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

presents only the coefficient estimates representing the impact of the different components
of the ACA (for all other covariates, excluding
geographic controls, see tables A4 and A5).
In congressional elections for the full sample, the DDD coefficient estimates on the Medicaid expansions suggest reductions of 3.1 and
3.6 percentage points in turnout, but the standard errors are large, so the estimates are not
statistically significant (the p-values are 0.489
and 0.416 respectively). The estimated effect of
the private portion of the ACA is similar in magnitude but positive rather than negative and
also statistically insignificant. Together, the estimated impacts of the private and Medicaid
expansions approximately cancel each other
out so that the full effect of the ACA is approximately zero.
The full sample DDD results for presidential

elections, shown in columns (3) and (4), are
somewhat different but lead to the same general conclusion of little overall effect. The Medicaid expansion now increases voter turnout by
2.7 to 2.8 percentage points—relative to a base
of around 60 percent—yet the coefficient is statistically insignificant. The estimated effect of
the private portion of the ACA is negative, but
smaller in magnitude: 1.9 to 2.3 percentage
points, with the latter being statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Combining the impacts of the private and Medicaid expansions
again yields full effects that are small and insignificant. Thus, as in congressional elections,
the fully implemented ACA had no statistically
significant impact on voter turnout in presidential elections.
Turning to our subsample DDD results,
much in the DD models, the congressional elec-
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tion results are often modest and statistically
insignificant, a few notable exceptions aside.
One notable finding is that for nonwhites, the
Medicaid expansion led to a statistically significant 8.8 to 9.2 percentage point reduction in
voter turnout in congressional elections and
the private portion of the ACA led to a statistically significant increase of 5.3 to 5.4 percentage points. Overall, the fully implemented ACA
led to a 3.4 to 4.0 percentage point reduction in
congressional turnout among nonwhites, the
4.0 percentage point estimate being statistically
significant at the 10 percent level and the 3.4
percentage point estimate statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.145). In the higher-income
subsample (more than $50,000), the private
portion of the ACA increases congressional
voter turnout by a sizable 5.1 to 5.8 percentage
points, with the 5.8 percentage point effect
without political controls being statistically significant at the 10 percent level and the 5.1 percentage point effect with political controls being statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.157).
Similarly, we see that most of the subsample
results for presidential elections continue to
reveal modest, insignificant effects with a couple exceptions. For nonwhites, the Medicaid
expansion increases turnout by 4.7 to 6.4 percentage points, but the estimates are not statistically significant. A more puzzling result is
that among the higher-income subsample, the
Medicaid expansion leads to a large (5.2 to 5.3
percentage point) and statistically significant
increase in turnout. Conceivably, this result
could reflect a spillover effect, following which
individuals whose coverage is not directly affected are nonetheless more motivated to vote
by broader considerations. For instance, Jake
Haselwerdt (2017) finds a backlash effect among
conservative voters opposed to ACA implementation. Additionally, the ACA provided greater
insurance protection to those who currently
have coverage but may be at risk of losing it in
the future.
M u lt i p le H y p o t h e s i s T e s t i n g

Tables 4 and 5 report evidence of scattered, and
sometimes surprising, statistically significant
effects across the various subsamples. However, given the large number of subsamples and
specifications, some statistically significant es-

timates would be expected to emerge simply by
chance. We therefore next ask whether any of
these effects survive adjustments for multiple
hypothesis testing. In other words, after accounting for multiple comparisons, can we reject the null hypothesis of no effects across any
subsamples?
The simplest multiple hypothesis test adjustment is the Bonferroni correction, which simply
divides the p-value necessary to obtain a given
level of significance by the number of hypotheses being tested. In our case, given eight subsamples (including the full sample), we divide
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 by eight to obtain new p-value
thresholds of 0.0125, and 0.00625, and 0.00125.
Such a procedure controls the overall type 1 error rate, making the probability of obtaining
any spurious results from the eight subsamples
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (Dunn 1961). Table 6 reports the p-values from the statistically
significant subsample estimates from tables 4
and 5. We see that the smallest (most highly
significant) p-value is 0.013, which does not
meet any of the Bonferroni-adjusted p-value
thresholds. In other words, we cannot conclude
that any of the effects are “real” after using the
Bonferroni correction.
A criticism of the simple Bonferroni method
is that it can be too conservative if the number
of tests is high or the test statistics are positively correlated (Moran 2003). One alternative
is the Holm-Bonferroni method, which controls
the type 1 error rate in a way that retains greater
statistical power. The lowest (most strongly significant) p-value is still subjected to same test
as the Bonferroni method—thresholds divided
by the number of tests. However, the next lowest p-value’s threshold is divided by the number
of tests minus one, the next lowest the number
of tests minus two, and so on (Holm 1979). In
our case, this means the second-lowest p-value
from a given group faces thresholds of 0.1, 0.05,
and 0.01 divided by seven, or 0.014, 0.00714, and
0.00143. The third-lowest p-value uses thresholds divided by six, or 0.01666, 0.0083, and
0.00167. Table 6 shows the p-value thresholds
for each specific statistically significant estimate, defining groups as the eight subsample
estimates for a particular treatment (Medicaid
or private), election type (congressional versus
presidential), and specification (for example,

r sf: t he russell sage f ou n dat ion jou r na l of t he so ci a l sciences

This content downloaded from
174.241.133.214 on Thu, 20 Aug 2020 04:19:54 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

t h e i m pac t on p ol i t ic a l pa r t ic i pat ion

197

Table 6. Holm-Bonferroni-Adjusted Significance Levels for Statistically Significant Subsample Results
Adjusted Significance
Levels

Sample and
Specification

Treatment

Estimate
(Standard Error)

P-Value

Congressional elections;
DD without political variables
Age forty through forty-nine
Income under $50k
Nonwhite

Medicaid
Medicaid
Medicaid

–0.052 (0.025)
–0.042 (0.023)
–0.044 (0.025)

0.044
0.074
0.076

.0125
.00625 .00125
.014
.00714 .00143
.01666 .0083
.00167

Congressional elections;
DD with political variables
Nonwhite
Age forty through forty-nine
Income under $50k

Medicaid
Medicaid
Medicaid

–0.043 (0.025)
–0.044 (0.024)
–0.040 (0.022)

0.090
0.074
0.082

.01666 .0083
.00167
.0125
.00625 .00125
.014
.00714 .00143

Congressional elections;
DDD without political variables
Nonwhite
Private
Nonwhite
Medicaid
Income $50k or more
Private

0.054 (0.026)
–0.088 (0.036)
0.058 (0.034)

0.042
0.018
0.098

.014
.00714 .00143
.0125
.00625 .00125
.01666 .0083
.00167

Congressional elections;
DDD with political variables
Nonwhite
Nonwhite

Private
Medicaid

0.053 (0.027)
–0.092 (0.036)

0.058
0.013

.014
.0125

.00714 .00143
.00625 .00125

Presidential elections;
DD without political variables
Nonwhite

Medicaid

0.038 (0.017)

0.030

.0125

.00625 .00125

Presidential elections;
DD with political variables
Nonwhite

Medicaid

0.035 (0.017)

0.046

.0125

.00625 .00125

Presidential elections;
DDD without political variables
Income $50k or more
Medicaid

0.053 (0.022)

0.021

.0125

.00625 .00125

–0.023 (0.013)
0.052 (0.023)

0.072
0.026

.014
.0125

.00714 .00143
.00625 .00125

Presidential elections;
DDD with political variables
Full sample
Income $50k or more

Private
Medicaid

.1

.05

.01

Source: Authors’ tabulations (Holm 1979).
Note: Estimated treatment effects and standard errors are copied from the corresponding cells of
tables 4 and 5. P-values are based on those estimates. Adjusted significance levels are computed
manually using the Holm-Bonferroni correction. To provide an example of how these results should be
interpreted, in the last row, the p-value of 0.026 is significant at the 5 percent level using traditional
hypothesis testing. However, after applying the Holm-Bonferroni multiple hypothesis adjustment, the
p-value would have to be below 0.00625 to be significant at the 5 percent level, and below 0.0125 to
even be significant at the 10 percent level. Therefore, the estimated effect is no longer significant at any
level. Accordingly, none of the results from the table remain significant after the adjustment.
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DD without political controls). We see that using the Holm-Bonferroni method instead of
Bonferroni does not help any effects to survive.
We still conclude that no evidence indicates
that any subsamples are affected.
Note that, if anything, this analysis errs on
the side of being too generous. It could be argued to define the groups more broadly, in
which case the adjustments would use even
lower p-value thresholds that divide by an even
larger number of hypothesis tests. In the most
extreme case, all estimates could be grouped
together, in which case the p-value thresholds
would be divided by sixty-four rather than
eight. In any case, the analysis from table 6 is
enough to make the case that not too much
should be made of the occasional stars from
tables 4 and 5. On balance, evidence is minimal
that the ACA meaningfully influenced voter
turnout, either for the full sample or for demographic subsamples.
R o b u s t n e s s C h ec ks

We next conduct a number of robustness
checks to address potential concerns with our
baseline specifications. The main finding is
that the general pattern of no statistically significant effect on voter turnout or registration
is robust to a variety of specification checks and
consideration of additional relevant policies.
In our baseline DDD model in equation (2),
we do not include a full set of state-year effects;
rather we include MEDICAIDs * POSTt to control
for time-varying differences across expansion
and non-expansion states. As a consequence,
the DDD model does not capture time-varying,
unobserved state-level confounders, but instead time-varying confounders common to all
states. To the extent of heterogeneity in voting
trends within the group of expansion or non-
expansion states, the MEDICAIDs * POSTt interaction will not control for it. As a specification
check, we explore the sensitivity of the results
to including a full set of state-year interactions
(table A6). By including state-year fixed effects,
our identification comes from within-state variation in uninsured rates at the local level. Our
primary conclusion—that the fully implemented ACA has virtually no effect on mobilization in the full sample—persists, although in
some cases the standard errors increase dra-

matically. In no instance is the full effect of the
ACA statistically significant for any subgroup.
In some instances, effects of the private portion
of the law and the Medicaid expansions are statistically significant and offsetting, but these
results are, as discussed earlier, susceptible to
the multiple hypothesis test critique.
Our voter turnout models in tables 4 and 5
have stratified the sample by congressional and
presidential elections, and especially for the
full sample, have found little impact in terms
of mobilization. We have estimated models that
pool all election years, since such an approach
would allow more precise estimation of the
treatment effects of the ACA. Even with the
larger sample (and two “post” years), we find
very little effect of the Medicaid expansion or
full ACA across our models (table A7). The Medicaid expansions insignificantly reduce turnout
(by up to 1.7 percentage points) for the full sample. The full effect of the ACA in the DDD models is not statistically significant for any demographic group (the largest point estimate of the
full effect of the ACA is a 1.9 percentage point
increase for white voters).
We also have estimated voter registration
models (tables A8 through A13). Broadly, the results continue to suggest small and statistically
insignificant effects in most cases. Given the
findings from our previous analysis of multiple
hypothesis testing, we are reluctant to attach
much importance to the handful of statistically
significant results in some of the subsamples.
A noteworthy result—across both the voter
turnout and registration models—is that including the state-level political controls makes
virtually no difference in the estimated effects
of the ACA. In the few cases when including
political controls affects statistical significance,
they do because both estimates are near a particular threshold. These findings suggest that
adoption of voting laws was essentially uncorrelated with Medicaid expansion decisions and
uninsured rates.
We next examine several additional institutional details that may affect the relationship
between the ACA and voter outcomes. These
include the ACA’s interaction with motor voter
legislation, the impact of turmoil from technology glitches during the first open enrollment
period, and the impact of changing the param-
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eterization on the percent uninsured variable
in our DDD analysis.
One important discussion point is how the
1993 motor voter legislation (National Voter
Registration Act or NVRA) might interact with
the ACA rollout (in turn potentially increasing
voter participation and especially registration).
The NVRA legislation mandates public assistance agencies to provide voter registration services to every person applying for or renewing
government benefits, including Medicaid (Michener 2016). Some groups take a more expansive view of what government benefits means
(above and beyond the Medicaid expansions
and state-run exchanges), and argue that the
NVRA applied to both federal and state-run exchanges, even though many states on the federal exchange did not expand Medicaid (Rho
and Barksdale 2013). The Obama administration, in contrast, acknowledged that NVRA applied to state-run exchanges but did not include
voter registration service in the ACA federal exchanges (Onek 2015).
Given widespread agreement that NVRA applied to public Medicaid coverage on state-run
exchanges, we focus on fourteen state-run exchanges only. It is far less clear, especially given
that the Obama administration ignored the
NVRA on federal exchanges, whether any predictions for expanding private coverage are especially useful. All states that ran their own exchange in 2014 also expanded Medicaid that
year. Of the state-run exchanges, six states acknowledged their obligation to provide voter
registration services under NVRA, and eight
states had no announced plans to comply with
NVRA (Rho and Barksdale 2013). We therefore
classify states as NVRA-compliant and estimate
DD models for congressional or presidential
elections, substituting this variable for the
Medicaid expansions. Similar to our original
DD model, the model now becomes
   Vist = θ0 + θ1(NVRA_COMPLIANTs * POSTt )
+ θ2 Xist + θ3 Pst + αs + τt + εist,
(3)

where the coefficient estimate θ1 represents the
DD estimate of NVRA compliance on the outcomes of interest. Our prediction is that, if the
motor voter act were enforced during the Medicaid expansion, states that affirmatively signed

199

on to NVRA would have higher registration
rates and perhaps voter turnout.
We estimate models for voter turnout and
registration, in congressional and presidential
elections, for these states (table A14). The findings suggest the ACA’s interaction with the motor voter act did not increase registration or
turnout. In all instances, the DD estimate is
negative for voter registration, the most directly
affected outcome. In most cases, the effect on
turnout is also negative. We might expect that
young adults, given their low registration and
high mobility, to be particularly sensitive to the
motor voter act, yet in NVRA-complaint expansion states, registration is falling, not rising.
Thus we find no evidence that the motor voter
act increased political participation after ACA
implementation.
In earlier work (Courtemanche et al. 2017),
we examined the impact of exchanges that experienced glitches. Amanda Kowalski (2014)
notes that six state-run exchanges had severe
technology glitches and that “the federal exchange had its own difficulties.” All six also had
a Medicaid expansion. Such glitches were
prominent during the open enrollment period
for the initial ACA rollout in 2014, but were corrected in subsequent open enrollments.
We focus on state-run exchanges, and examine whether turmoil through technology
glitches affected voter outcomes. We focus on
the fifteen jurisdictions Kowalski (2014) classifies as state exchanges, six of which had
glitches. Because all of these states also had
Medicaid expansions, we modify our DD framework by replacing Medicaid expansion with exchange glitch:
Vist = ϑ0 + ϑ1(GITCHs * POSTt ) + ϑ2 Xist + ϑ3 Pst
+ αs + τt + εist,
(4)

where the coefficient estimate ϑ represents the
DD estimate of exchange glitches on the outcomes of interest. Our prediction is that, if a
state experienced technology glitches, enthusiasm about the ACA would be diminished,
thereby affecting voter turnout or registration.
Such glitches were corrected by open enrollment window for 2015; therefore, we only examine the impact of glitches for congressional
elections, which includes 2014.
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We estimate models for voter turnout and
registration in congressional elections for these
fifteen jurisdictions (table A15). The findings
suggest that exchanges glitches did not increase registration or turnout. In all but one
case, the DD estimate is insignificant and relatively small. For the full sample, voter turnout—an expression of frustration with
glitches—insignificantly increased by 0.5 percentage points in the 2014 election (standard
error of 1.8 percentage points). Voter turnout
does not increase for any group due to glitches,
and only one group experienced a registration
increase (although the same critiques about
multiple hypothesis testing apply here).
Finally, we modify our primary DDD specification by examining different parameterizations of the local, pretreatment uninsured rate.
First, we compute the DDD estimates using the
uninsured rate from 2010 rather than 2013 (table A16). When the ACA was enacted in 2010,
the earliest provisions to reduce the uninsured
were implemented soon after (such as the dependent coverage mandate); thus, the uninsured rate in 2013 may not accurately measure
the pre-period. Second, we compute the 2013
pretreatment uninsured rate for individuals under 250 percent of the FPL (table A17). For both
parameterizations, the DDD findings are remarkably stable to the main findings.
Di s c u s s i o n

In this study, we explored the broader ramifications of the ACA by examining the impact on
political participation. Using large samples of
respondents from the publicly available CPS
Voter and Registration Supplements from 2006
to 2016 and a DDD methodology to estimate the
impact of both the private and public portion
of the law, we find little impact on mobilizing
newly eligible insured individuals to vote or register. Our study thus contributes to the literature by disentangling the causal impact of the
different components of the ACA on our outcomes of interest, rather than focusing on a
single component in isolation.
More generally, this article contributes to an
emerging empirical examination on how the
ACA, or Medicaid in particular, affects public
opinion and policy, polarization, and other
non-health outcomes. Richard Fording and

Dana Patton (2020) examine the policy backlash
(in the form of work requirements) from the
ACA’s Medicaid expansions, which is difficult
to reconcile with the notion that Medicaid produced positive policy feedback, supportive constituencies, and policy entrenchment. They argue that the full range of policy feedback effects
can mixed or negative, which can lead to self-
undermining consequences such as policy regression. Their hypotheses are empirically supported in an original dataset on gubernatorial
support for Medicaid work requirements. Julianna Pacheco, Jacob Haselwerdt, and Jamila
Michener (2020) examine how polarization in
ACA support varies by both policy choices and
party in power. They find that attitudes are especially polarized in states with aligned partisan environments where Democratic governors
support setting up state health exchanges. Carrie Fry, Thomas McGuire, and Richard Frank
(2020) isolate the impact of Medicaid on criminal recidivism, and find the expansion has a
small negative relationship with recidivism.
Our findings stand in contrast to some other
recent work on the ACA (Haselswerdt 2017;
Clinton and Sances 2018). Overall, our analysis
does not find significant voter mobilization in
response to the ACA during the 2014 and 2016
elections. It is interesting to contrast our empirical findings based on the 2014 and 2016 elections with the conventional wisdom that the
2018 congressional election was a referendum
on the ACA that generated increased voter turnout. Several points about such a comparison
are significant. First, some of our political variables (such as automatic registration) were only
starting to be implemented toward the end of
our 2006 to 2016 period and very well could have
enhanced turnout in the 2018 election (and beyond). Second, Gallup polls suggest that voters
always rank health-care policy as a top priority.
According to these polls, in 2012, 2014, 2016,
and 2018 the share of voters ranking health care
as “extremely / very important” was 80 percent,
64 percent, 77 percent, and 80 percent respectively (Newport 2012, 2014, 2018; Jones 2015).
Third, even though health care is consistently
ranked as a high priority, it may have been
more salient in 2018. In 2014, when President
Barack Obama was in office, it was clear that
ACA repeal efforts would not survive a veto. In
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2016, the election of President Donald J. Trump
was a shock, and voters would not have anticipated serious repeal efforts under a Clinton
presidency. In contrast, by 2018, President
Trump had the opportunity to work with a Republican House and Senate, and almost succeeded in a skinny repeal in July 2017. In addition, three fairly conservative states had
Medicaid expansions on the ballot in 2018. As
a consequence, both the gains and losses from
the ACA were far more salient, which might
suggest a heterogeneous treatment effect.
Nonetheless, it is not clear that the skinny
repeal or state-level Medicaid expansions (or
Medicaid work requirements) mobilized voters,
versus the 2018 turnout (and outcome) being a
more general referendum on Trump’s presidency. Issues such as polarization, immigration, gun violence, and sexual harassment on
the one hand, and the booming economy and
Supreme Court appointments on the other, are
likely to have affected turnout as well. Thus,
even with the heightened salience in 2018, we
would be reluctant to ascribe the turnout as primarily an ACA mobilization effect. This suggests the need for more research incorporating
2018 data from the CPS and other data sources.
One limitation of the CPS is that its measures
of political participation do not allow us to examine attitudes or ideology, and thus we are
not able to observe whether changes in turnout
across various subgroups was concentrated
among Democrats or Republicans (which
would suggest a backlash to repeal efforts).
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